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FAITH, JUSTICE, AND THE TEACHING OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MICHAEL M. O'HEAR'
Many of us who teach at religiously affiliated law schools find
ourselves pondering from time to time the significance of the religious
affiliation. Legal education, after all, is a form of professional training,
and the legal profession is a decidedly secular one. Our students, by
large, come to us seeking the knowledge and skills they will need to be
successful in this secular undertaking. Most, I suspect, would regard
proselytizing in the classroom, or any extended, overt treatment of
matters of faith, as, at best, a distraction from the true mission of the law
school.1 Indeed, many religiously affiliated law schools boast such
religious diversity among students and faculty that it is hard to imagine
any teacher promoting an aggressively sectarian agenda in the classroom
without causing a bitter and divisive backlash from students and
colleagues.
One can, of course, debate whether religiously affiliated law schools
ought to strive for greater homogeneity of religious belief. Should, for
instance, Catholic law schools hire only Catholic teachers and admit
only Catholic students? My own instincts are that a school that purports
to prepare students for professional careers in an increasingly diverse
American society ought to deliver its education in an institutional
environment that promotes comfort with, and appreciation of,
important forms of social diversity, including religious. But this difficult
question is not really my subject in this Essay. Instead, for present
purposes, I will simply assume that it would be unwelcome and
inappropriate for me, in my law school classroom, either to seek
converts to my religious faith or to persuade my students, on strictly
religious premises, to adopt particular positions on controversial social
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 1996;
B.A., Yale College, 1991. This Essay was originally presented as a talk at the Sixth Annual
Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools at Baylor Law School in March 2006. I am
grateful to Mark Osler for his efforts in organizing the conference, Steve Chanenson for
inviting me to speak at the conference, and numerous participants at the conference for their
questions and feedback.
1. I would, of course, except from this generalization elective courses on law and
religion, church law, and the like.
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issues that are closely associated with one church or another (e.g., the
anti-abortion or anti-death-penalty positions of the Catholic Church).2
Does this mean that I must check my faith at the classroom door?
My answer is a qualified no: faith values need not be wholly suppressed.
Even with a due regard for the diversity of religious beliefs within the
classroom and the predominantly secular expectations that most
students have of their professional education, I do think that I can
appropriately introduce into the classroom normative perspectives on
the law that are informed by my faith values. I should hasten to
underscore what, for me, is an important distinction, that is, between
perspectives informed by, as opposed to derived from, faith values. I
have in mind principles of human dignity and the value of life that, for
me and many others, resonate profoundly with our religious traditions,
but that do not necessarily depend, in an intellectual sense, on any
particular theological framework.
Is this approach really any different than what I might employ in the
classroom at a non-religiously affiliated law school? I have never taught
at such a law school, so I cannot say with certainty whether I would feel
equally comfortable with this approach in other contexts. I can say that,
despite the essentially secular nature of our undertakings, I do perceive
a real openness at my religiously affiliated law school to normative
perspectives that are morally richer than formalism, law and economics,
or legal process. And it is not entirely implausible that this openness is
enhanced, at least on the margins, by our religious affiliation, by our
chaplain, and by the small acknowledgements of a higher being we
routinely make as an institution, such as the saying of invocations and
benedictions at formal law school events.

In the remainder of this Essay, I will move from the general to the
specific, providing an illustration of how my teaching of one course,
Criminal Procedure, is informed by my faith values. In particular, I will
focus on one important challenge with which I wrestle when teaching
Criminal Procedure: how to encourage students to think about
2. This is not to say that students should be discouraged from arguing in favor of such
positions in the classroom; good teachers, I think, are capable of welcoming a student's
religious perspectives in class discussion without endorsing those perspectives or leaving other
students feeling unduly put-upon. One might draw an analogy to the Supreme Court's
discussion of a "corridor between the Religion Clauses," that is, a "space for legislative action
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause."
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005).
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procedural justice in ways that go beyond the conventional reliability
paradigm, that is, the view that procedural safeguards exist solely in
order to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions.
By way of background, I will begin with a critique of the American
criminal justice system that is grounded, at least in my mind, on some
core elements of my Christian faith. I do not mean to suggest that this
critique is Christian or Catholic per se, but rather that, to my way of
thinking at least, the critique gains particular force from its connection
to certain values espoused by the Christian Gospels. These values may
be summed up as follows. All human beings are children of God and
members of the Body of Christ. As such, each person possesses an
essential and irreducible dignity that must be respected by all other
people. Jesus provides our great model here. Time and again, in the
Gospels, He reaches out to, and shows compassion for, the socially
marginalized: the poor,3 lepers,4 the disabled,' tax collectors,6 the

woman caught in adultery,7 members of disfavored ethnic groups,8 and
even one of the criminals crucified next to Him. 9 Jesus teaches that all
of us-including, perhaps most notably for my purposes, those who
violate our criminal laws-have intrinsic value in the eyes of God,
regardless of social prejudices to the contrary.
This belief, however, is in tension with many of the basic premises of
our American criminal justice system. For one thing, so much of the
system is directed to stigmatizing, shaming, and degrading criminal
defendants. Professor Whitman has done some particularly compelling
work in identifying and critiquing these tendencies in the American
system, for instance, contrasting the indignities of life in American
prisons with the more self-consciously respectful treatment accorded
Western European inmates.'"
Perhaps even more insidious, though, than the intentional efforts to
degrade is the criminal justice culture of speedy case processing." Put
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See, e.g., Mark 10:46-52 (healing of blind beggar).
See, e.g., Luke 5:12-13 (healing of leper).
See, e.g., John 5:1-9 (healing of disabled man by the pool).
See, e.g., Matthew 9:9-13 (eating with tax collectors and sinners).
John 8:1-11.
See, e.g., John 4:7-26 (conversation with woman from Samaria).
Luke 23:39-43.

10. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).

11. Professor Natapoff offers a similar account of this culture in Alexandra Natapoff,
Speechless: The Silencing of CriminalDefendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005).
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yourselves in the shoes of a typical criminal defendant. Like most
criminal defendants, you cannot afford a lawyer to represent you.
Fortunately, the state will provide a lawyer for you. Unfortunately, that
lawyer-poorly paid and under-resourced-will be juggling your case
along with dozens, perhaps hundreds, of others. Your contact with your
lawyer will be sporadic and fleeting. Your case-like approximately
ninety percent of American criminal cases-will almost certainly be
resolved through a plea bargain. The deal will be negotiated by the
prosecutor and your lawyers with little or no direct involvement by you,
and probably based chiefly on a police officer's version of the events.
Then your lawyer will present the deal to you on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. In order to pressure you to plead quickly, your lawyer is apt to
repeat, and even amplify, the threats made by the prosecutor about the
terrible price you will pay at sentencing if you exercise your
constitutional right to a jury trial.
So when do you get your day in court? Technically, you must speak
at the change-of-plea hearing, but this involves little more than giving
carefully scripted answers to a series of yes-no questions posed by the
judge. At sentencing, you will have a greater opportunity to speak your
mind, but your lawyer will discourage you from doing much more than
offering a terse and unconditional apology for the crime. Your lawyer
will likely say more on your behalf, but, remember, this is an overtaxed
public defender: he probably will not go much beyond a brief recitation
of a few factual circumstances that he believes are likely to evoke the
judge's sympathy. In the end, the sentencing hearing is apt to be a
remarkably short and casual affair, given that years of a human being's
life may be at stake.
Defendants, in short, are often well justified in feeling that no one in
the system-not even their own lawyers-really cares about who they
are, where they have come from, and what their perspective is on the
crime. In my view, a system that makes profoundly important decisions
about an individual's life without first giving that individual a
meaningful opportunity to tell his or her side of the story is a system that
treats human beings in a degrading fashion. Even assuming-for
argument's sake-that the system "works" (in the sense that no
innocent people are convicted, and no unjustifiably harsh sentences are
imposed), I would still contend that the system is not a just one, at least
as I understand the term "justice" in light of my beliefs about human
dignity.
The reliability paradigm of procedure-which exalts conviction
accuracy far above other values-is, I think, at least partly to blame for
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this culture of speedy case processing. Why? If the people in the system
are thinking about procedure solely in terms of reliability, they are not
apt to have qualms about the culture I have just described. By and
large, the system does work, or at least gives the appearance of working,
if working is understood in that limited sense of not punishing the
innocent. Most people in the system, even defense lawyers, seem
reasonably confident that most defendants really are guilty.
This is an understandable assumption. In general, defendants
become defendants because some nominally objective, professional law
enforcement officials decided there was probable cause that they
committed a crime. Most defendants, moreover, come from socially
disadvantaged backgrounds and have multiple characteristics (race,
income, sex, ethnicity, education, age, criminal history, gang affiliation)
that are associated with elevated levels of criminality.
In the end, if guilt can plausibly be assumed from the outset in most
cases, then, from a reliability standpoint, we may justifiably feel
comfortable with the sort of highly expedited process that I criticized
earlier.
For that reason, I think it important, when I teach Criminal
Procedure, to help my students-many of whom will be practicing
criminal law in the not-too-distant future-to see alternatives to the
reliability paradigm, even though that paradigm does seem dominant in
the relevant case law.
The constitutional right to counsel cases are a particularly effective
vehicle. I start with Powell v. Alabama,12 the famous Scottsboro case. A
group of poor, black defendants faced capital rape charges in the Jim
Crow-era South.13 A lawyer was not appointed until the eve of trial.'4
He was obviously ill-prepared, and despite the flimsy nature of the
state's evidence, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to
death.' Why should this be regarded as a due process violation (as the
Supreme Court held)?' 6 The answer is reasonably clear: because there
was no real adversarial testing of the evidence in the case, the verdict
was unreliable-a good lawyer would have drawn out the gaps and
inconsistencies in the stories of the complaining witnesses, and thereby
12. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id. at 56.
15. The weaknesses in the State's case were exposed in a later retrial involving a better
prepared defense lawyer. See Stephan Landsman, History's Stories, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1739,
1739-41 (1995).
16. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
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prevented a wrongful conviction. It is no real stretch for students to see
that a system with a high risk of wrongful convictions is not a just
system.
With Strickland v. Washington," however, the story becomes
considerably more complicated.
David Washington, charged with
capital murder, confessed and pled guilty against the advice of his
lawyer.1 8 Feeling a sense of hopelessness about the case, the lawyer then
did essentially nothing to prepare for the sentencing hearing.19 For
purposes of comparison, I tell students about the hundreds of hours two
other lawyers and I have spent on a pro bono capital case investigating
the family background, education, work history, medical history, and
mental health of our client. Although the efforts of Washington's
lawyer plainly did not comport with the norms of experienced capital
defense lawyers, the Supreme Court rejected Washington's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court did so, in large part, by
reference to what I term the reliability paradigm: there was absolutely
no reason to doubt the accuracy of Washington's conviction, and the
supposedly sympathetic information about Washington's personal
background and mental state that was unearthed by post-conviction
counsel was far less than compelling. The Court, using the language of
the test it imposed for "ineffective assistance of counsel" claims, found
no "reasonable probability" of a different outcome if Washington's first
lawyer had done the sort of investigation and presentation of evidence
that was performed by post-conviction counsel.2"
Justice Marshall's dissent, which I think is outstanding, embodies the
contrasting dignity paradigm. Marshall wrote, "The majority contends
that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty
defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a
manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree."2 ' Even if he received
no better outcome than he deserved, Marshall argued, David
Washington was entitled to a better process.2 His lawyer-feeling
"hopeless" by his own admission-gave up on him. Lost to David
Washington was any meaningful opportunity to place his crimes in
context; to present himself in the public setting of the courtroom as a

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 711 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
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real human being, rather than a sociopath; and to show that he was
capable of doing good in the world, not just evil. In my view,
Washington did indeed suffer real prejudice, measured by the rejection
of his basic human dignity, even if his lawyer was wholly incapable of
altering the judgment of death that was ultimately rendered.
Strickland thus functions as a terrific vehicle for encouraging
students to think about procedural justice in broader terms than
reliability, as well as the special role that defense lawyers may play in
helping defendants to tell their side of the story.
23
Matters become even more complicated with Farettav. California,
in which the Court recognized a defendant's right of self-representation.
One striking feature of the case is that both the majority and the dissent
took for granted that the pro se defendant will, in general, do a poorer
job of subjecting the state's case to robust adversarial testing than will
the defendant represented by counsel.24
Indeed, the majority
acknowledged that its decision was in tension with Powell.2 If not
reliability, then what values are advanced by Faretta? Our discussion of
Strickland suggests an answer: the right to mount a pro se defense
ensures that the defendant really can tell his or her side of the story
without a recalcitrant or incompetent lawyer getting in the way. Indeed,
Faretta is an unusual decision in the way that the Court self-consciously
subordinated reliability values to dignitary interests.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which emphasizes the reliability costs
of self-representation, 26 problematizes my view that defendants should
be given a fair opportunity to tell their side of the story. A defendant's
view about what is important about his or her background and conduct
may undermine or distract from favorable evidence that is more directly
relevant to the legal issues in a case. I tell students here about a
dilemma that not infrequently confronts capital defense lawyers. The
law recognizes mental illness and mental retardation in various ways as
defenses to capital punishment.2 7 Reliability values thus indicate that
the capital defense lawyer should always present evidence of mental
illness and retardation. On the other hand, these are stigmatizing
conditions in our society. Some capital defendants have spent years

23. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
24. Id. at 832-33, 838.
25. Id. at 832-33.
26. Id. at 839-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring execution of mentally
retarded criminals).
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attempting to overcome or hide such conditions and may view the
prospect of baring such conditions in court as profoundly degrading.
What should the lawyer do when the client refuses to be presented in
the most legally advantageous manner, when the defendant's chosen
"story" about himself omits information that might save his life?"s
Throughout the discussion of Strickland and Faretta, I strive for a
balanced presentation, giving reliability its due and not insisting that
students agree with my alternative understanding of procedural justice.
Indeed, through our discussion of the Faretta dissent, I self-consciously
attempt to problematize my view. I do hope, however, that the
discussion will cause students at least to question the reliability
paradigm and perhaps contribute to a greater sensitivity to issues of
basic human dignity in the criminal justice system.

28. For a penetrating analysis of the pressure on capital defense lawyers to fit their
clients into extreme "caricatures" of mental illness, see James M. Doyle, The Lawyers' Art:
"Representation" in CapitalCases, 8 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 417, 442-46 (1996).

